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verify	 identities,	while	 the	SSL	protocol	 is	used	 to	provide	a	
secure	encrypted	tunnel	through	which	data	can	be	sent	over	a	
public	network.	Combined	both	of	these	technologies	provides	
the	 basis	 of	 the	 public	 key	 infrastructure	 (PKI).	 While	 the	
concept	of	PKI	is	a	good	idea,	the	different	implementation	of	
the	technologies	in	different	operating	system	and	clients	often	
lead	 to	 weaknesses.	 This	 paper	 proposes	 a	 methodology	 to	
automate	the	testing	of	SSL	clients	by	generating		both	bogus	
and	 malformed	 certificates	 in	 order	 to	 evaluate	 the	 client’s








Certificates	 play	 an	 important	 part	 in	 validating	 the	
authenticity	of	 the	server	that	a	client	 is	connecting	to,	while	
the	Secure	Socket	Layer	(SSL)	protocol	 is	used	to	provide	an	
encrypted	 tunnel	 through	which	 traffic	 can	be	 securely	 sent.	
Together,	 certificates	 and	 the	 SSL	 protocol	 provide	 the	
cornerstone	upon	which	PKI	is	built	[1].			
To	verify	a	server,	a	certificate	authority	(CA)	like	Godaddy	
or	 VeriSign	 can	 be	 used	 to	 sign	 a	 certificate,	 thus	 leaving	 a	







To	 copy	otherwise,	 or	 republish,	 to	post	on	 servers	or	 to	 redistribute	 to	 lists,	
















the	 protocol	 in	 different	 ways	 and	 this	 could	 lead	 to	 the	
protocol	behaving	differently	between	implementations.	While	
the	SSL	protocol	provides	a	 secure	 layer,	 it	 is	critical	 for	 the	




• Presenting	 a	 methodology	 which	 can	 be	 used	 for	
evaluating	weaknesses	in	the	PKI	
The	 remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organised	 as	 follows,	
Section	 2	 presents	 the	 background	 on	 PKI	 and	 X.509	
certificates	while	also	describing	the	SSL	handshaking	process	



















The	 SSL	 Protocol	 is	 used	 in	 conjunction	 with	 X.509	
certificates	 to	 authenticate	 the	 server	 that	 the	 client	 is	
connecting	to,	along	with	providing	encryption	mechanisms	to	
protect	the	data	flow	between	the	client	and	the	server	[4].	









The	 second	 step	 in	 the	SSL	protocol	 is	 for	 the	 server	 to	

























Once	 this	 process	 is	 complete	 a	 secure	 communication	
path	between	the	server	and	the	client	will	be	established.	
2.2	 Certificate	Authorities	
When	 PKI	 is	 used	 one	 area	 of	 concern	 that	 needs	 to	 be	
addressed	 is	 how	 servers	 are	 authenticated.	 To	 help	
accomplish	this	a	body	called	a	CA	can	be	used.		
The	 CA	 is	 responsible	 for	 taking	 an	 application	 from	 a	
server	and	verifying	that	they	are	the	legitimate	owner	of	the	
domain	that	they	are	trying	to	authenticate.	For	example,	if	a	
server	 submits	 an	 application	 for	 bank.com	 the	 CA	 will	 be	
responsible	for	verifying	that	the	application	is	from	the	server	
who	 owns	 the	 website	 and	 not	 a	 hacker	 trying	 to	 set	 up	 a	
phishing	website	to	attract	unsuspecting	customers	[4]	
	










robust	 verification	 process	 that	 focuses	 on	 verifying	 the	
credentials	of	the	customer	[7].	
2.3	 X.509	Certificates	
Within	 the	PKI	 there	 is	 a	key	 requirement	 to	verify	 that	 the	
server,	a	client	 is	trying	to	establish	a	secure	communication	
with,	 is	 legitimate.	 The	 mechanism	 through	 which	 this	 is	
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a	 certificate,	 it	 does	 not	 dictate	 how	 the	 encoding	 is	 being	
achieved.	 This	 means	 that	 one	 implementation	 of	 the	 ASN1	
encoding	rules	can	differ	from	another	[4],	leading	to	potential	
vulnerabilities		in	a	version	of	the	ASN1	rules.	
2.3.2 X.509 Certificate Field Names 
This	section	examines	the	structure	of	an	X.509v3	certificate	by	
discussing	 some	 of	 the	 common	 fields	 used	 to	 create	 a	
certificate	as	shown	in	Figure	2.		
The	Common	Name	(CN)	is	the	most	important	field	as	it	
is	 used	 to	 indicate	 the	 name	 of	 the	 website	 that	 is	 being	
connected	 to	 [8].	 If	 the	 certificate	 is	 for	 the	 domain	 name	
corresponding	 to	 www.google.com,	 then	 when	 the	 domain	
name	is	entered	as	a	URL	in	a	web	browser	it	is	expected	that	
both	the	URL	field	in	the	browser	and	in	the	certificate	match.	
If	 the	 names	 are	 different	 then	 a	 warning	 message	 will	 be	
displayed.		
The	 CA	 also	 uses	 this	 field	 to	 verify	 the	 identity	 of	 the	
owner	for	the	website	by	taking	the	URL	specified	in	the	CN	and	
performing	a	DNS lookup.	The	information	specified	in	the	DNS	










application	 is	 made	 to	 a	 CA	 for	 an	 X.509	 certificate,	 the	
certificate	will	be	granted,	as	the	hacker		is	the	legitimate	owner	
of	the	domain	name.		
The	 extended	 validation	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 takes	 the	
process	a	step	further	by	performing	a	more	in-depth	check	of	
the	domain	by	verifying	that	the	domain	actually	belongs	to	the	
company,	as	well	as	verifying	 that	the	 company	 is	 legitimate	




since	 they	 are	 able	 to	 afford	 the	 additional	 costs	 in	 going	
through	 the	 more	 rigorous	 verification	 process.	 In	 a	 web	









validity	 period	 and	 they	 are	 notbefore	 and	 notafter.	 The	
notbefore	field	is	used	to	set	a	start	date	while	the		notafter	
field	is	used	to	set	an	end	date	for	the	certificate	validity.	







generated	 [10].	 The	 certificate	 contains	 general	 information	
about	the	holder	and	the	public	key	will	be	embedded	in	the	





















By	 following	 this	process,	 if	 one	 IC	 is	 violated	 then	only	
that	 certificate	 is	 made	 invalid	 and	 therefore	 only	 the	
certificates	signed	with	it	will	required	to	be	reprocessed	[5].	
Each	 time	 a	 CA	 issues	 a	 certificate	 a	 serial	 number	
identifying	 the	 certificate	 is	 associated	 with	 it.	 This	 serial	








There are two options for creating certificates, the first option is 
called self-signed while the second option uses what is called a 
CA.  





own	 root	 certificate	and	use	 it	 to	 sign	 their	own	certificates.	
While	this	is	a	cost	saving	option,	it	has	the	disadvantage	that	
the	 identity	 of	 their	 server	 is	 not	 proven	 by	 a	 recognised	
authority	[1].		
The	 self-signing	 process	 should	 only	 be	 used	 when	 the	






The	 user	will	 typically	 ignore	 the	warning	message	and	






the	 identity	of	 the	owner	of	 the	website	can	be	verified	by	a	
third	party	and	thus	increasing	trust.	




OpenSSL	 is	 an	 open	 source	 implementation	 of	 the	 SSL	
protocol	 that	 allows	 the	 use	 of	 various	 cryptographic	
algorithms	 such	 as	 AES,	 DES,	 and	 RSA	 to	 create	 X.509	
certificates	[14].	The	advantage	of	OpenSSL	is	that	it	is	available	
on	many	different	platforms	including	Windows	and	Linux.	









This	 section	 provides	 a	 high-level	 overview	 of	 the	 proposed	
methodology	for	testing	SSL.		This	methodology	will	be	used	for	
finding	weaknesses	in	an	SSL	implementation	as	well	as	being	
able	 to	 be	 used	 to	 identify	 differences	 in	 how	 SSL	 functions	
between	different	implementations.	






The	 compose	 tests	 procedure	 requires	 the	 creation	 of	 a	
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3.2.1  Generate Directories 
The	 aim	 of	 the	 generate	 directories	 function	 is	 to	 create	 a	
unique	directory	based	upon	the	test	name.	This	function	will	
first	examine	the	current	directory	structure	and	if	 it	detects	
that	 there	are	 files	 left	 over	 from	a	previous	 test	 then	it	will	
delete	them.	This	ensures	that	the	test	will	be	starting	from	a	
blank	slate.	
3.2.2  Generate Apache Website Configuration 
Once	the	directory	structure	has	been	created	the	next	step	is		
to	create	the	Apache	configuration	file.	This	configuration	file	
contains	 the	 directory	 locations	 of	 the	 root	 of	 each	 website	
generated	along	with	where	the	generated	X.509	certificate	and	
key	are	located.	
The	 final	 step	executed	 in	 the	Generate	Apache	Website	
function	is	to	generate	a	unique	HTML	page	for	each	test	based	













This	 section	 discusses	 the	 test	 Scenarios	 generated	 for	 the	
methodology	along	with	what	the	expected	result	of	each	test	


















3.4.1 WrongKey Test 











It	 is	 expected	 that	 when	 an	 SSL	 client	 encounters	 this	
certificate	 that	 a	 warning	 page	 is	 displayed	 stating	 that	 the	
certificate	 is	 invalid	 and	 the	 website	 will	 be	 blocked	 from	
loading.	
3.4.3  MissingStart Test 
The	MissingStart	test	will	generate	a	certificate	that	has	the	
start	date	missing	from	the	certificate.	It	is	expected	that	when	
an	SSL	 client	encounters	 this	 certificate	 that	a	warning	page	
will	be	displayed	stating	that	the	certificate	is	invalid	and	the	
website	will	be	blocked	from	loading.	




be	 displayed	 stating	 that	 the	 certificate	 is	 invalid	 and	 the	
website	will	be	blocked	from	loading.	




years	 in	the	 future	and	it	will	 be	 interesting	 to	 see	 if	an	SSL	
client	 can	handle	an	end	 date	 that	 is	50	 years	 in	 the	 future.	
When	 an	SSL	 client	 encounters	 this	 certificate	 it	 is	 expected	
that	no	error	messages	will	be	displayed	and	it	will	allow	access	
to	the	website.	






3.4.7  FooCN Test 
The	FooCN	 test	will	 include	 a	 different	 common	 name	 than	
what	is	expected.	The	website	will	be	using	the	domain	name	
of	 localhost.example.com	 but	 when	 the	 FOOCN	 option	 is	
specified	a	different	common	name	will	be	used	which	in	this	
case	will	be	localhost.foo.com.		




It	 is	 expected	 that	 when	 the	 browser	 encounters	 a	
certificate	 with	 a	 common	 name	 that	 is	 different	 from	 the	
domain	name	then	a	warning	message	will	be	displayed	and	the	
website	will	not	be	loaded.	
3.4.8  TabCN Test 
The	 TabCN	 test	 will	 insert	 a	 tab	 escape	 character	 into	 the	
common	name.	Like	with	the	NULLCN	test	it	is	expected	that	
the	 tab	 escape	 character	 will	 be	 rejected	 by	 the	 encoding	
routines.		
3.4.9  BackspaceCN Test 
The	BackspaceCN	test	will	insert	a	backspace	escape	character	
into	 the	 common	 name.	 Like	 with	 the	NULLCN	 option	 it	 is	
expected	that	the	tab	escape	character	will	be	rejected	by	the	
encoding	routines.	




3.4.11  LongRandomSerial Test 
The	LongRandomSerial	test	will	generate	a	large	number	that	
would	 not	 normally	 be	 seen	 on	 an	 X.509	 certificate.	 It	 is	
expected	that	there	will	be	an	upper	limit	to	the	length	of	the	
serial	 number	 and	 that	 the	 test	 will	 fail	 due	 to	 an	 invalid	
number	being	used.	
3.4.12  SameSerial Test 
The	SameSerial	will	generate	the	same	serial	number	for	two	
X.509	 certificates.	 It	 is	 expected	 that	 when	 an	 SSL	 client	






















WrongKey	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
SwapStartEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
MissingStart	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
MissingEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
LongEnd	 Pass	 Ö	 Pass	 Ö	
NullCN	 Fail		 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	
FOOCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
TabCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
BackspaceCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
LongOU	 Fail	 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	
LongRandomSerial	 Fail	 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	





message	 was	 displayed	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6.	 This	 is	 the	








The	 next	 two	 tests	 MissingStart	 and	 MissingEnd	 were	
unable	to	be	run	since	the	Apache	webserver	would	not	allow	
the	 websites	 to	 load.	 This	 shows	 that	 Apache	 performs	 an	







The	 next	 four	 tests	 NullCN,	 FOOCN,	 TabCN	 and	
BackspaceCN	focus	on	testing	the	Common	Name	(CN)	field.		
Three	 of	 the	 tests	 (	 FOOCN,	 TabCN	 and	 BackspaceCN)	
failed	as	expected.	The	reason	for	this	is	because	the	CN	field,	
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for	 the	 string	 so	 that	 the	 common	 name	 is	
localhost.example.com	 instead	 of	
localhost.example.common.org.	This	means	that	the	CA	is	being	









sanitisation	 is	 not	 being	 performed.	We	 would	 	 recommend	
that	 the	 X.509	 standard	 is	modified	 to	 stipulate	 that	 escape	
characters	are	forbidden	from	being	used	within	the	fields	of	
the	 certificate.	 thus	 only	 standard	 ASCII	 and	 UNICODE	
characters	would	be	accepted.		
The	 next	 test	 that	 was	 executed	 was	 the	 LongOU	 test	
where	an	attempt	is	made	to	overflow	the	OU	field	of	the	X.509	





was	 not	 included	 as	 it	 exceeded	 the	 maximum	 permissible	















that	 uses	 the	 scenario	 of	 two	 certificates	 on	 the	 same	 web	
server	having	the	same	serial	number.		
When	executing	this	test	it	was	noted	that	the	first	website	
that	was	 visited	 on	 port	 3009	 resulted	 in	 the	website	 being	





and	 this	 time	 the	 site	 accessed	 through	 port	 3010	was	 first	
visited	which	result	in	a	successful	view	of	the	website	and	then	
the	site	accessed	on	port	3009	was	then	visited	which	resulted	








chance	of	being	 successful.	This	 result	proves	 that	 there	 is	 a	









WrongKey	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
SwapStartEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
MissingStart	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
MissingEnd	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
LongEnd	 Pass	 Ö	 Pass	 Ö	
NullCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Incomplete	
FOOCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
TabCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
BackspaceCN	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	
LongOU	 Fail	 Ä	 Pass	 Ö	
LongRandomSerial	 Fail	 Ä	 Fail	 Ä	













behavior	 from	 when	 the	 same	 code	 was	 run	 in	 the	 test	 1	
configuration.	
The	next	result	that	was	different	is	the	SameSerial	Test.	





The	 reason	 as	 to	 why	 the	 NullCN,	 SameSerial	 and	
LongRandomSerial	tests	had	different	results		is	in	the	way	that	
the	 SSL	 client	 is	 implemented,	 since	 the	 standard	 does	 not	
insist	 upon	 a	 standard	 implementation,	 it	 is	 left	 up	 to	 the	
programmers	to	implement	and	this	can	result	in	differences	in	
the	way	the	clients	implement	certain	functionality.	This	again	
highlights	 the	 need	 for	 a	 methodology,	 such	 as	 the	 one	
described	 in	 the	 paper,	 for	 testing	 SSL	 as	 it	 can	 be	 used	 to	
illustrate	 differences	 in	 behaviour	 	 between	 SSL	
implementations.		
From	 the	 test	 results	 it	 shows	 that	 the	 Firefox	 web	
browser	is	more	stringent	in	checking	for	errors	in	the	X.509	






One	 of	 the	 main	 results	 that	 were	 achieved	 was	 to	
highlight	how	the	different	operating	systems	implement	the	
SSL	protocol	as	can	be	seen	with	the	NullCN,	SameSerial	and	





was	 that	 escape	 characters	 can	 be	 encoded	 in	 the	 X.509	
certificates	fields	like	Organisational	Unit,	Common	Name	and	
so	on.	This	fact	could	be	used	to	encode	SQLi	attacks	against	the	








why	 the	 limits	 could	 not	 be	 exceeded	 is	 because	 the	 ASN1	
structure	was	predefined	by	the	use	of	OpenSSL	API	and	it	was	
not	possible	to	change	this.		
To	 test	 for	buffer	overflows	a	different	 approach	would	
have	 to	be	 taken	whereby	 the	methodology	would	create	 its	
own	 ASN1	 structure	 and	 not	 be	 reliant	 upon	 the	 structure	
defined	by	OpenSSL.		
Another	area	that	could	be	investigated	is	to	examine	the	
encoding	 of	 	 SQLi	 attacks	 within	 the	 X.509	 certificates	 as	
numerous	agencies	store	the	certificates	using	databases.		
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